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EXPANDING THE CHILD TAX CREDIT FOR LOW-INCOME WORKERS OR PARENTS OF INFANTS WOULD HAVE MODEST EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS

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As policymakers consider changes to the child tax credit (CTC) in 2025, this brief highlights new findings from Wiersma Strauss and colleagues (2025) examining the credit's effect on parental employment and estimating the employment impacts of various modifications to the credit. Our estimates suggest: phasing in the refundable portion of the credit starting with the first dollar of earnings on a per-child basis up to $2,000 per child would increase employment among unmarried mothers by 1.3 percentage points; increasing the credit amount and making it fully refundable for parents of children under two years old would slightly reduce employment by about 0.1 percentage points, with the largest declines in employment among unmarried mothers (0.2 percentage points); increasing the maximum *nonrefundable* credit amount to $5,000 per child would primarily affect middle- and upper-income married mothers, raising their employment by about 0.5 percentage points. If this larger maximum credit also applied to the *refundable* portion of the credit (currently $1,700 per child) while keeping current phase-in rules, we estimate employment for unmarried mothers would increase by 1 percentage point. This new research demonstrates that it is possible for policymakers to expand access to the CTC, including for low-income workers and parents of very young children, while having little effect on reducing parental employment and, in some cases, increasing parental employment.

The impact of tax policies like the child tax credit (CTC) on recipients' employment decisions is of perennial concern to policymakers, in part because these effects can support or diminish other policy goals like poverty reduction (Bastian 2023, 2024; Hoynes and Patel 2018). As researchers explore how child-related tax policies like the CTC can improve the short- and longer-term well-being of children, especially those living in families with low incomes, understanding the potential employment and anti-poverty effects of these policies helps to provide a more complete picture of their impact (Barr, Eggleston, and Smith 2022; Goldin, Maag, and Michelmore 2022; Heckman and Masterov 2007; Maag et al. 2023).

A policy that leads to modest reductions in parental employment, for example, may be an acceptable tradeoff if the policy has sufficiently large beneficial effects on the health, well-being, education, or future employment prospects of children (Aizer, Hoynes, and Lleras-Muney 2022; Garfinkel et al. 2022). By comparison modest increases in parental employment may lead to increases in family income over and above the additional income from the credit and may further increase parental investments in children (Bastian and Michelmore 2018; Hoynes and Patel 2018).

Our research (Wiersma Strauss et. al 2025) provides new estimates of how parents' employment decisions have been impacted by past expansions of the CTC. We then use these estimates to project how modifications to the CTC could affect employment in the future. Our findings are consistent with previous research (Bastian and Jones 2021, Chetty et al. 2013; Hoynes and Patel 2018; Wielk, Lautz, and Snyderman 2023), although they are half as large as the estimates used by Corinth et al. (2021). When used to project the impacts of various proposals to expand the CTC, these estimates suggest that certain CTC policy changes could both boost employment and enhance benefits for low-income families. Other changes to the credit may lead to modest reductions in parental employment that should be balanced with other policy goals.

This brief begins by providing an overview of the CTC and how it has changed over time as well as a discussion of how economic theory suggests the CTC can affect parental employment decisions. It then summarizes new estimates of how responsive parents' decisions to work are to changes in the CTC. It concludes by exploring what these estimates may mean for understanding potential employment effects of various CTC proposals in the 2025 tax legislation debate.[1]

WHAT IS THE CTC AND HOW HAS IT CHANGED OVER TIME

Originally enacted in 1997, the CTC was initially a relatively modest $400 nonrefundable credit per child under 17 years old. Because it was nonrefundable, it could only be used to offset income taxes, meaning many low-income families who owed little to nothing in income taxes could not access the benefit.[2] A refundable credit, by contrast, is not limited by what a family owes in income taxes.

Since enactment, Congress has modified the credit in a myriad of ways including increasing the maximum credit amount, allowing low-income taxpayers to receive part or all of the credit in the form of a refundable credit which phases in with their earnings, and expanding the income range over which families are eligible (Crandall-Hollick 2021).

The CTC currently provides families with a credit of up to $2,000 per child. For families with high enough earnings and tax liability, the credit reduces a family's income taxes by up to $2,000 per child under 17.[3] If a family's credit is more than what they owe in income taxes, they can receive some or all of the difference as a refundable credit.[4] The refundable portion of the CTC equals 15 percent of a family's earnings above $2,500, up to a maximum of $1,700 per child.[5] The credit begins to phase out once a family's income exceeds $200,000 for single parents or $400,000 for married couples (figure 1). The Tax Policy Center estimates that in 2025, almost 90 percent of families with children will benefit from the CTC, receiving an average benefit of $2,740.[6] A smaller share of low-income families benefit from the credit because of the phase-in, while some higher-income families do not receive it due to the phaseout.

Several temporary changes to the CTC enacted as part of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) are scheduled to expire at the end of 2025, including doubling the maximum credit, a cap on the refundable portion of the

credit, and availability of the credit to higher-income families as illustrated in Figure 1.[7] The pending expiration of the TCJA's changes to the credit provides an opportunity for policymakers to decide whether to extend the TCJA modifications, let them expire, or enact new changes to the credit.

FIGURE 1

The Child Tax Credit Was Temporarily Expanded by the TCJA

Child Tax Credit Amounts by Adjusted Gross Income for a Single Parent with One Qualifying Child



Source: Authors' calculations.

Notes: CTC = child tax credit. TCJA = Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. These calculations assume adjusted gross income equals earnings, the taxpayer files as head of household, and the child meets all tests to qualify for the credit. The 2026 CTC is the credit amount assuming the temporary TCJA changes have expired.

UNDERSTANDING HOW THE CTC CAN AFFECT EMPLOYMENT

Theoretically, the CTC's impact on parental employment depends on two factors: how much the credit changes work incentives and how sensitive a recipient is to those changes. Economists generally refer to how the policy changes both a recipient's return to work and a recipient's nonlabor income. The degree of responsiveness to those changes is measured as an "elasticity."

The **return to work** compares an individual's net earnings—their earnings after taxes (including tax credits) and government transfers—when working to their net earnings when not working. **Nonlabor income** is the income available to individuals when they are not working and can include spousal income, income from investments like capital gains, government transfers available when individuals don't work, and Social Security benefits. An **elasticity** measures how responsive an individual's employment decision is to both changes in their return to work and changes in nonlabor income. Elasticities are generally calculated as a ratio, in this case as the percentage change in employment divided by the percentage change in either the return to work or nonlabor income.[8]

The CTC affects employment by changing both the return to work and nonlabor income. The phase-in of the refundable portion of the credit with earnings is designed to encourage work by raising its after-tax return: every dollar of additional earnings in the phase-in range of the benefit schedule produces a $1.15 increase in after-tax income. Phasing in the credit faster, for example, would increase the return to work.

If an individual already has enough income to receive the maximum CTC, the credit amount would no longer increase if they worked more.[9] This may be particularly relevant for certain secondary earners in married couples. If the couple continues to be eligible for maximum CTC benefits even if the lower earning spouse

works less or doesn't work at all, the credit is not providing this spouse with an additional incentive to work, rather it is increasing this spouse's nonlabor income. In this case, increasing the maximum credit, as was done temporarily by the TCJA for example, could reduce the employment of the lower-earning spouse since the additional income from the larger maximum credit means the household can afford to spend more time outside of paid work.

The ultimate impact a tax credit like the CTC has on a person's decision to work depends on not only how it changes their return to work and nonlabor income, but how responsive they are to that change.[10] If a tax credit boosts an individual's income from working—i.e., it increases the return to work—*and* the recipient is very responsive to this effect (their response is *elastic*), they would have a high probability of entering the labor force or increasing hours worked in response to the tax policy (referred to as a *substitution elasticity*). If they are less responsive (*inelastic*), they would be less likely to enter the labor force or increase their hours worked even if the return to work from a policy was high.

In contrast, if a tax credit boosts an individual's nonlabor income, an individual could work less and still maintain the same standard of living. The degree of this response is measured using an *income elasticity*. When these effects are aggregated over the population, researchers can estimate how a tax policy may affect overall employment.[11]

While the CTC's theoretical effects on parental labor supply are well understood, there is limited research on how parents' decisions to work have been affected by past expansions to the CTC. This is because, outside of the temporary CTC expansion in 2021,[12] the average CTC benefit has been smaller than other tax credits targeted to working parents of dependent children, namely the earned income tax credit (EITC). Empirical analysis has thus focused on the labor supply effects of the EITC, finding that it increased the labor supply of unmarried mothers, especially during the 1990s (Bastian 2020; Dahl et al. 2009; Eissa and Liebman 1996; Gelber and Mitchell 2012; Grogger 2003; Hoffman and Seidman 1990; Hoynes and Patel 2018; Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001; Schanzenbach and Strain 2021).

By comparison, research has found that EITC expansions led to small reductions in married mothers' employment, primarily because these expansions increased their nonlabor income (Eissa and Hoynes 2004, 2006). More recent studies suggest that recipients' labor supply decisions are still responsive to the EITC, but to a lesser degree (Bastian 2023; Bastian and Jones 2021; Blau and Kahn 2005; Chetty et al. 2013; Elder et al. 2023; Hoynes and Patel 2018), while some research suggests recipients' employment decisions were nonresponsive to most changes in the EITC (Kleven 2024).

To date, a few working papers (Kang 2021; Lippold 2022; Wiersma Strauss 2025; Zheng 2023) have examined the effect of the CTC on parental labor supply outside of the COVID-19 context.[13] Like the EITC literature, these studies find both positive effects on employment driven by increases in the return to work, especially for less educated unmarried women (Kang 2021) and unmarried women with young children (Zheng 2023).They also find negative effects on employment and hours worked, especially for higher-income secondary earners largely due to increases in nonlabor income (Wiersma Strauss 2025). Our new working paper adds to this limited body of research.

NEW RESEARCH ON THE EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF THE CTC

Our working paper provides new estimates of the responsiveness of parental employment to changes in the CTC, finding modest effects in line with most recent research. The working paper uses the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), a nationally representative, biannual survey that follows the same families over time and contains data on various sources of household income that have been consistently measured across decades, including since the CTC's introduction in the late 1990s. Using employment data in the PSID, we produce updated elasticity estimates, based on changes in the return to work and nonlabor income between 1997 and 2019 for unmarried mothers and married mothers.[14]

We estimate these elasticities using two different models. Our *return to work* model assumes that parents respond to changes in the CTC the same way they do to changes in wages. Then, we relax this assumption in our *separate components model*, which assumes that parents react differently to changes in wages versus changes in their taxes. The estimates presented in this brief are those associated with the return to work model and are universally higher than those from the separate components model.

We find mothers are moderately responsive to changes in the return to work, with estimated elasticities of 0.39 and 0.38 for unmarried and married mothers, respectively (in other words, a 10 percent increase in the return to work results on average in a 3.9% increase share of unmarried mothers who are employed).[15] We also found small income elasticities, in response to changes in nonlabor income, of about -0.03 and 0.13 for unmarried mothers and married mothers respectively.[16] These estimated elasticities are within the range of recent research (see figure 2).

FIGURE 2

New Research Finds Decisions to Work Are Moderately Responsive to CTC Changes

Estimates of labor supply elasticities for unmarried and married mothers from changes in the return to work and nonlabor income



Source: Wielk, Lautz, and Snyderman 2023; Chetty et al. 2013, and Wiersma Strauss et al. 2025

Notes: Elasticities from Wiersma Strauss et al. 2025 in red; other elasticities compiled in Wielk, Lautz, and Snyderman in blue include those from the National Academies of Sciences 2019 (income elasticities of -0.085 for single mothers; -0.12 for married mothers); Corinth et al. 2021 (substitution elasticities of 0.75 for low-income single mothers, 0.25 for all other tax units; income elasticities of -0.085 for low-income single mothers and -0.05 for all other tax units); Goldin et al. 2022 (substitution elasticities of 0.2 for single mothers and 0.3 for married mothers; income elasticities of -0.085 for single mothers and -0.12 for married mothers); Brill et al. (substitution elasticity of 0.25 for all earners; income elasticity of -0.05 for all earners); and Bastian 2023 preferred elasticities (substitution elasticities of 0.4 for low-income single mothers and 0.2 for all other mothers). Chetty et al. 2013 reports elasticities between 0.3 and 0.45 for EITC-eligible populations which are illustrated with shading. These ranges are similar to those in Hoynes and Patel 2018 (0.32-0.37) and Bastian and Jones 2021(0.33).

Projecting the Longer-Term Impact of CTC Policy Changes on Parental Employment

How parents' employment decisions have been affected in the past can be used to project the impact of future policy changes. Using our estimated elasticities, we predict employment responses to several CTC policy

changes, including phasing in the refundable portion of the credit faster, creating a larger and fully refundable CTC for children under age 2, and expanding the maximum per child credit amount.

Phasing in the refundable portion of the CTC faster would increase unmarried mothers' employment while slightly reducing the employment of married mothers. Phasing in the refundable portion of the CTC on the first dollar of earnings on a per child basis up to $2,000 per child would increase employment slightly for unmarried mothers (by about 1.3 percentage points) and reduce it for married mothers (by about 0.4 percentage points) compared with the existing TCJA CTC.[17]

This seemingly anomalous result arises because these options increase the return to work for unmarried mothers while generating larger income than substitution effects on average for married mothers.[18] Other research that does not look at employment effects finds that this option would especially benefit low-income children (Crandall-Hollick, Maag, and Jha 2025). Our results suggest the amplifying effects of increased parental employment could further increase resources available to these children.

Creating a larger and fully refundable CTC for very young children by reinstating the 2021 CTC exclusively for children under age 2 would slightly reduce overall employment by about 0.1 percentage points, with the largest response for unmarried mothers whose employment would fall by less than 0.2 percentage points.[19]

Families with newborns face especially high child care costs and are most likely to experience dips in income (Maag, Hunter, and Yama 2025). Existing research has documented the importance of investing in children when they are young, and legislators from both major political parties have recognized that importance by providing larger credits to younger children (Barr, Eggleston, and Smith 2022; Heckman and Masterov 2007).[20] This option would provide the largest credit increases to those with the lowest incomes.

Increasing the maximum credit amount to $5,000 per child is only estimated to substantially affect the employment of married mothers, increasing their employment by about 0.5 percentage points.[21] The change would increase the amount of income taxes that can be offset by the credit but would not change how much credit lower-income families receive as a refundable credit.

This option thus only benefits households with higher-income tax liability (due to their higher incomes) who are typically married parent households. In contrast, if this expansion was also extended to lower-income parents so that the maximum amount of the refundable portion of the credit also phased in to $5,000 per child, this would provide a stronger work incentive for unmarried mothers, for whom we estimate a one percentage point increase in employment.[22]

Restoring the 2021 CTC, while not under active consideration in 2025, remains an important marker for policymakers given the significant impact this expansion had on reducing child poverty in 2021 (Burns and Fox 2022). Our research suggests a modest overall reduction in employment of about 1.5 percentage points, with the largest impacts among unmarried mothers, reducing their employment by about 3.8 percentage points.

These estimates are comparable with those from other microsimulation models (see Wielk, Lautz, and Snyderman 2023) and about half as large as those estimated by Corinth et al. (2021). They suggest that the anti-poverty impact of this policy change would still be large even as some parents' income would fall if they stopped working.

TABLE 1

Most Options to Modify the Child Tax Credit Would Have Modest Effects on Parental Employment

Predicted Percentage Point Change in Employment Relative to TCJA Baseline

	Enhanced Phase-In of Refundable CTC	$3,600 Fully Refundable CTC for Children Under 2 Years Old	Maximum $5,000 per child CTC (nonrefundable)	Maximum $5,000 per child CTC (refundable)	2021 CTC
Unmarried Mothers Baseline 81.57% employed	1.34	−0.17	0.04	0.99	−3.79
Married Mothers Baseline 61.28% employed	−0.38	−0.13	0.54	0.05	−0.96
Overall Baseline 77.82% employed	0.11	−0.12	0.26	0.29	−1.50

Source: See Table 7 in Wiersma Strauss et al. 2025.

Notes: CTC=child tax credit. The enhanced phase-in of the refundable CTC models phasing on the refundable portion of the CTC with the first dollar or earnings on a per-child basis up to $2,000 per child. Fully refundable means low-income families can receive the maximum credit amount (i.e., the phase-in with earnings is eliminated). Increasing the maximum CTC to $5,000 per child (nonrefundable) means the credit can reduce income taxes by up to $5,000 per child. The 2021 CTC models the larger credit enacted in 2021 by the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) which included a larger maximum credit of up to $3,600 per child under 6 years old, $3,000 per child 6 to under 18 years old and a fully refundable credit for low-income families. These options are modeled as if they were in effect in 2019.
These estimates are from the return to work (RTW) model in Wiersma Strauss et al. 2025. When researchers relax the assumption that parents react the same to changes in wages and changes in taxes under the "separate components model," the estimated employment effects of changes to the CTC are less than those in this table.

CONCLUSION

The CTC has proven to be a powerful tool to help families with children. Given the strong policy interest in understanding how different CTC expansions could affect parental employment, limited evidence on the CTC's labor supply effects prior to the 2021 expansion, and the likelihood of legislative changes to CTC in 2025, our research provides new evidence of the responsiveness of parental employment to changes in tax policy. We find that policymakers can expand access to the CTC, including for low-income workers and parents of very young children, while having little effect on reducing parental employment and, in some cases, increasing parental employment.

NOTES

[1] The CTC has been a key policy concern of Congress in the debate around how to address expiring provisions of the TCJA. For example, at the beginning of the 119th Congress, Senator Josh Hawley proposed expanding the credit to help working families (see, for example, "Hawley Unveils NEW Child Tax Credit Proposal to Support Working Families," Senator Josh Hawley, December 17, 2024, https://www.hawley.senate.gov/hawley-unveils-new-child-tax-credit-proposal-to-support-working-families/). In addition, Senator Mike Crapo, chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance, has been reported to be considering expansions to the CTC, including the refundable portion of the credit accessible to lower-income families (see Brian Faler, "Crapo: Republicans Considering Expanding Child Credit, Including for Those with Very Low Incomes," Politico Pro, March 19, 2025,

https://subscriber.politicopro.com/article/2025/03/crapo-republicans-considering-expanding-child-credit-including-for-those-with-very-low-incomes-00238766). A side-by-side of legislation to modify the child tax credit during the 2025 debate can be found at "Comparing Child Tax Credit Legislation in the 2025 TCJA Debate," Tax Policy Center, last updated May 29, 2025, https://taxpolicycenter.org/comparing-child-tax-credit-legislation-2025-tcja-debate.

[2] Prior to Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2021 (P.L. 107-16), the child credit was only refundable for families with three or more children under the alternative formula. Under the alternative formula, the refundable credit is calculated as the excess of a taxpayer's payroll taxes (including one-half of any self-employment taxes minus their earned income tax credit, not to exceed the maximum amount of the refundable portion of the credit. Even when the credit was made refundable based on earned income, the alternative formula remains in effect, and families with three or more children may still claim it if it provides a bigger benefit.

[3] In addition to being under 17, a qualifying child for the CTC must be related to the taxpayer and must generally live with the taxpayer claiming them for more than half the year (exceptions apply). From 2018 through the end of 2025, the child must also have a Social Security number. Families with older children and adult dependents are eligible for a $500 nonrefundable credit for each of these dependents. This credit, sometimes referred to as the "other dependent tax credit" or ODTC, is added to a family's child tax credit and phased out according to the same rules.

[4] The refundable portion of the child tax credit is referred to by the IRS as the additional child tax credit or ACTC and claimed on a separate line of the federal income tax return than the portion of the credit that offsets income taxes. Combined, the ACTC and the portion that offsets income taxes cannot be greater than $2,000 per child.

[5] The refundability cap of the ACTC under the TCJA is the only parameter of the child tax credit that is indexed for inflation. The cap, statutorily set at $1,400 per child, is indexed for inflation and equaled $1,700 in 2024 and 2025. For more information, see Rev. Proc. 2024-40, Internal Revenue Service, October 22, 2024, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rp-24-40.pdf.

[6] See "Tax Benefit of the Child Tax Credit (CTC), by Expanded Cash Income Percentile, 2025," Table T25-0090, Tax Policy Center, April 15, 2025, https://taxpolicycenter.org/model-estimates/t25-0090-tax-benefit-child-tax-credit-ctc-expanded-cash-income-percentile-2025.

[7] The TCJA changes to the CTC included increasing the maximum CTC from $1,000 per child to $2,000 per child, reducing the earnings threshold for the refundable portion of the credit from $3,000 to $2,500, increase the maximum refundable portion of the credit from $1,000 per child to $1,400 per child and indexing this amount for inflation (in 2024 and 2025 the maximum refundable portion of the credit was $1,700 per child), and increasing the income level at which the credit begins to phase down from $75,000 ($110,000 if married filing jointly) to $200,000 ($400,000 if married filing jointly). The law also requires that taxpayers provide a Social Security number (SSN) for each child for whom they claimed the credit. These changes have been in effect since 2018 and are scheduled to expire at the end of 2025. In addition, the law created a $500 credit for each dependent that was not child tax credit eligible. This credit, sometimes called the other dependent tax credit or ODTC will also expire at the end of 2025. See Internal Revenue Code section 24 and Rev. Proc. 2024-40, Internal Revenue Service, October 22, 2024, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rp-24-40.pdf.

[8] For example, an elasticity of 0.5 with respect to the return to work would means a 10 percent increase in the return to work would lead to 5 percent increase in employment.

[9] In some cases, additional income results in the credit phasing down (see figure 1).

[10] Our working paper focuses on the how changes to the return to work and nonlabor income impact people's decision to work (the "extensive margin") rather than hours worked (the "intensive margin") for three main reasons. First, much of the debate about CTC policy design has been about how CTC design affects participation in the labor force. Second, as discussed in our working paper, evidence from the EITC suggests that the intensive margin is relatively insensitive to tax credits. Third, data on hours worked in publicly available surveys such as the PSID are quite noisy (because of missing values and measurement errors), making small changes in hours more difficult to precisely estimate.

[11] This process is generally how researchers have projected the longer-term employment effects of policies using *microsimulation models*.

[12] In 2021, Congress temporarily modified the CTC for one year and effectively turned the CTC into a child allowance for low- and middle-income families as part of the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA). ARPA expanded the CTC in three ways. First, the maximum credit increased to up to $3,000 per qualifying child ages six and over and $3,600 per child under age six. These higher credit amounts began to phase out when a married couples' income exceed $150,000 ($112,500 for single parents). Second, the maximum age for an eligible child was increased from 16 to 17. Third, the phase-in with earnings was eliminated, making the full or maximum credit available to the lowest income families, including those without any earned income to report on their tax return or taxes owed. This policy change became known as "full refundability."

[13] Previous research has examined the labor supply effects of the temporary ARPA CTC expansion during 2021 (see both our working paper and Schanzenbach and Strain 2024 for an overview), but the extreme disruption of the global pandemic makes it difficult to isolate the separate effect of tax policy from the many other confounding factors at play that year.

[14] Our research also estimates elasticities for married fathers, but given how small they are, both in prior research and in our study, these estimates are not discussed further in this brief. These estimates can be found in table 4 of the working paper. Wiersma Strauss et al. 2025 also estimates elasticities based on the race-ethnicity of the parent, the education of the parent and the age of their youngest child, which are not discussed in this brief. These analyses reveal differential employment responses to changes in the return to work and nonlabor income by the age of one's youngest child (with the largest response among married mothers with a child under age 2), educational attainment (largest response among less-educated unmarried mothers), and race-ethnicity (largest response among non-Hispanic Black unmarried mothers and married fathers, and Hispanic married mothers).These estimates can be found in tables 8, 9, and 10 of the working paper.

[15] Married fathers have an estimated substitution elasticity of 0.07. See table 4, panel B in Wiersma Strauss et al. (2025).

[16] Married fathers have an estimated substitution elasticity of -0.004. See table 4, panel B in Wiersma Strauss et al. colleagues (2025).

[17] See table 7, panel A in Wiersma Strauss et al. (2025).

[18] For married mothers, phasing in the refundable portion of the CTC faster generates larger income than substitution effects on average since a faster phase-in lessens the amount of income needed to receive the maximum refundable portion of the credit. For secondary earners, this means that more CTC benefits are considered nonlabor income, since they can be earned based on their spouses' income alone.

[19] See Table 7, Panel A in Wiersma Strauss et al. (2025).

[20] See for example the various bills in the 119th Congress that would provide a larger CTC to younger children. A side-by-side of legislation to modify the child tax credit during the 2025 debate can be found at "Comparing Child Tax Credit Legislation in the 2025 TCJA Debate," Tax Policy Center, last updated May 29, 2025, https://taxpolicycenter.org/comparing-child-tax-credit-legislation-2025-tcja-debate.

[21] See table 7, panel A in Wiersma Strauss et al (2025).

[22] See table 7, panel A in Wiersma Strauss et al. (2025).

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