In a new paper, my Tax Policy Center colleague Yuri Shadunsky and I show what happened. Never before had the state and local consumption and investment been negative three years into a recovery, but in 2009, it was down by about 4 percent (see chart immediately below).
[[{"type":"media","view_mode":"default","fid":"128016","attributes":{"class":"media-image aligncenter size-full wp-image-4791","typeof":"foaf:Image","style":"","width":"450","height":"327","alt":"blog3"}}]] What was different? First, the Great Recession was longer and more destructive than any other post-war recession. The severity meant that many state rainy-day funds, which had been replenished after the 2001 recession and are designed to help states weather downturns, were insufficient to protect against the slump. Second, state and local governments were reluctant to sufficiently raise taxes to cover the decline in revenue (many states did raise taxes through higher rates or base broadening, but these measures replaced only a fraction of the lost revenue due to the recession). And third, the steep decline in housing prices meant that property tax revenues collapsed, though this took a while because assessments often lag changes in market value.Like the decline in state and local consumption and investment, this fall in property tax revenue was unprecedented. In prior recoveries, inflation-adjusted property tax revenue typically grew by 10 percent three years after the recession had ended. But in 2009, property tax revenue was down by 1 percent (see chart below).
These trends reinforce what millions of homeowners and the long-term unemployed already know: This recession and subsequent recovery are very, very different.